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Abstract—Covert wireless communication can prevent an ad-
versary from knowing the existence of user’s transmission, thus
provide stronger security protection. In AWGN channels, a
square root law was obtained and the result shows that Alice
can reliably and covertly transmit O(√n) bits to Bob in n
channel uses in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Willie).
However, existing work presupposes that Willie is static and only
samples the channels at a fixed place. If Willie can dynamically
adjust the testing distance between him and Alice according to his
sampling values, his detection probability of error can be reduced
significantly via a trend test. We found that, if Alice has no
prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide her transmission
behavior in the presence of an active Willie, and the square
root law does not hold in this situation. We then proposed a
novel countermeasure to deal with the active Willie. Through
randomized transmission scheduling, Willie cannot detect Alice’s
transmission attempts if Alice can set her transmission probabil-
ity below a threshold. Additionally, we systematically evaluated
the security properties of covert communications in a dense
wireless network, and proposed a density-based routing scheme to
deal with multi-hop covert communication in a wireless network.
As the network grows denser, Willie’s uncertainty increases, and
finally resulting in a “shadow” network to Willie.
Index Terms—Physical-layer Security; Covert Communica-
tions; Active Eavesdropper; Trend Test.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are changing the way we interact with
the world around us. Billions of small and smart wireless
nodes can communicate with each other and cooperate to fulfil
sophisticated tasks. However, due to the inherent openness
of wireless channels, the widespread of wireless networks
and development of pervasive computing not only opens up
exciting opportunities for economic growth, but also opens the
door to a variety of new security threats.
Traditional network security methods based on cryptog-
raphy can not solve all security problems. If a wireless
node wishes to talk to other without being detected by an
eavesdropper, encryption is not enough [1]. Even a message
is encrypted, the pattern of network traffic can reveal some
sensitive information. Additionally, if the adversary cannot as-
certain Alice’s transmission behavior, Alice’s communication
is unbreakable even if the adversary has unlimited computing
and storage resources and can mount powerful quantum attacks
[2]. On other occasions, users hope to protect their source
location privacy [3], they also need to prevent the adversary
from detecting their transmission attempts.
Covert communication has a long history. It is always
related with steganography [4] which conceals information in
covertext objects, such as images or software binary code.
While steganography requires some forms of content as cover,
the network covert channel requires network protocols as
carrier [5] [6]. Another kind of covert communication is spread
spectrum [7] which is used to protect wireless communication
from jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider
another kind of physical-layer covert wireless communications
that employs noise as the cover to hide user’s transmission
attempts.
Consider the scenario where Alice would like to talk to
Bob over a wireless channel in order to not being detected
by a warden Willie. Bash et al. found a square root law
[8] in AWGN channels: Alice can only transmit O(√n)
bits reliably and covertly to Bob over n uses of wireless
channels. If Willie does not know the time of transmission
attempts of Alice, Alice can reliably transmit more bits to
Bob with a slotted AWGN channel [9]. In practice, Willie
has measurement uncertainty about its noise level due to
the existence of SNR wall [10], then Alice can achieve an
asymptotic privacy rate which approaches a non-zero constant
[11] [12]. In discrete memoryless channels (DMC), the privacy
rate of covert communication is found to scale like the square
root of the blocklength [13]. Bloch et al. [14] discussed the
covert communication problem from a resolvability perspec-
tive, and developed an alternative coding scheme to achieve
the covertness.
In general, the covertness of communication is due to the
existence of noise that Willie cannot accurately distinguish
Alice’s signal from the background noise. To improve the per-
formance of covert communication, interference or jamming
can be leveraged as a useful security tool [15] [16] [17]. In
[18], Sober et al. added a friendly “jammer” to wireless envi-
ronment to help Alice for security objectives. Soltani et al. [19]
[20] considered a network scenario where there are multiple
“friendly” nodes that can generate jamming signals to hide the
transmission attempts from multiple adversaries. Liu et al. [21]
and He et al. [22] studied the covert wireless communication
with the consideration of interference uncertainty. From the
network perspective, the communications are hidden in the
noisy wireless networks.
For the methods discussed above, the eavesdropper Willie
is assumed to be passive and static, which means that Willie
is placed in a fixed place, eavesdropping and judging Alice’s
behavior from his observations. However, an active Willie can
launch other sophisticated attacks. Willie is active does not
mean he can interact with other nodes involved. An active
Willie is a passive eavesdropper who can dynamically adjust
the distance between him and Alice according to his sampling
value to make more accurate test. At the beginning, Willie
is far away from Alice, gathering samples of the background
noise, and employing a radiometer to detect Alice’s behavior.
If he finds his observations look suspicious, Willie moves to
a closer place for further detection. After having gathered a
number of samples at different places, Willie makes a decision
on whether Alice is transmitting or not. We found that, if
Alice has no prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide
her transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie
in her vicinity, and the square root law does not hold in this
situation. Willie can easily detect Alice’s transmission attempts
via a trend test. To deal with the active Willie, we propose a
novel countermeasure to increase the detection difficulty of
Willie, and then present a density-based routing scheme for
multi-hop covert communication in a dense wireless network.
The primary contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
1) We introduce an active Willie for the first time and
show that the square root law is no longer valid in
the presence of the active Willie. Besides, other covert
communication methods, such as interference or coop-
erative jamming, have little effect on the covertness in
the presence of the active Willie.
2) To deal with the active Willie, we propose countermea-
sures to confuse Willie further. We show that, through
a randomized transmission scheduling, Willie cannot
detect Alice’s transmission attempts for a certain sig-
nificance value if Alice’s transmission probability is set
below a threshold.
3) We further study the covert communication in dense
wireless networks, and propose a density-based routing
(DBR) to deal with multi-hop covert communications.
We find that, as the network becomes more and more
denser and complicated, Willie’s difficulty of detection
is greatly increased, and nonuniform network is securer
than a uniform network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model, In Section III, we present the
active Willie attack. The countermeasures to the active Willie
are studied in Section IV, and the covert communication in
a dense wireless network is discussed in Section V. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper and discusses possible future
research directions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
Consider a wireless communication scene where Alice (A)
wishes to transmit messages to Bob (B). An eavesdropper, or
a warden Willie (W) is eavesdropping over wireless channels
and trying to find whether or not Alice is transmitting. We
adopt the wireless channel model similar to [8]. Each node,
legitimate node or eavesdropper, is equipped with a single
omnidirectional antenna. All wireless channels are assumed
to suffer from discrete-time AWGN with real-valued symbols,
and the wireless channel is modeled by large-scale fading with
path loss exponent α (α > 2).
Let the transmission power employed for Alice be P0, and
s(A) be the real-valued symbol Alice transmitted which is a
Gaussian random variable N (0, 1). The receiver Bob observes
the signal y(B) = s(A) + z(B), where z(B) ∼ N (0, σ2B,0) is
the noise Bob experiences. As to Willie, he observes the signal
y(W ) = s(A)+z(W ), and z(W ) is the noise Willie experiences
with z(W ) ∼ N (0, σ2W,0). Suppose Bob and Willie experience
the same background noise power, i.e., σ2B,0 = σ
2
W,0 = σ
2
0 .
Then, the signal seen by Bob and Willie can be represented
as follows,
y(B) ≡
√
P0
dαA,B
· s(A) + z(B) ∼ N (0, σ2B) (1)
y(W ) ≡
√
P0
dαA,W
· s(A) + z(W ) ∼ N (0, σ2W ) (2)
and
σ2B =
P0
dαA,B
+ σ20 (3)
σ2W =
P0
dαA,W
+ σ20 (4)
where dA,B and dA,W are the Euclidean distances between
Alice and Bob, Alice and Willie, respectively.
B. Active Willie
In [8] and [20], the eavesdropper Willie is assumed to
be passive and static, which means that Willie is placed in
a fixed place, eavesdropping and judging Alice’s behavior
from his samples y
(W )
1 , y
(W )
2 , · · · , y(W )n with each sample
y
(W )
i ∼ N (0, σ2W ). Based on the sampling vector y =
(y
(W )
1 , · · · , y(W )n ), Willie makes a decision on whether the
received signal is noise or Alice’s signal plus noise. Willie
employs a radiometer as his detector, and does the following
statistic test
T (y) =
1
n
yHy =
1
n
n∑
k=1
y
(W )
k ∗ y(W )k > γ (5)
where γ denotes Willie’s detection threshold and n is the
number of samples.
The system framework with an active Willie is depicted
in Fig. 1. Willie can move to several places to gather more
samples for further detection.
In the Fig. 1, Willie detects Alice’s behavior at 2t different
locations (each location is d meters apart). At each location
he gathers m samples. For example, at t-th location, Willie’s
samples can be presented as a vector
yt = (y
(W )
t,1 , y
(W )
t,2 , · · · , y(W )t,m ) (6)
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Fig. 1. Covert wireless communication in the presence of an active Willie
who leverages a trend analysis to detect Alice’s transmission attempts.
where each sample y
(W )
t,m ∼ N (0, σ2W ).
The average signal power at t-th location can be calculated
as follows
T (yt) =
1
m
yt
Hyt. (7)
Therefore Willie will have a signal power vector T, consisting
of 2t values at different locations
T = (T (y1), T (y2), · · · , T (yt), · · · , T (y2t)) (8)
Then Willie decides whether (T (y1), T (y2), · · · , T (y2t)) has
a downward trend or not any trend. If the trend analysis shows
a downward trend for given significance level β, Willie can
ascertain that Alice is transmitting with probability 1− β.
C. Hypothesis Testing
To find whether Alice is transmitting or not, Willie has to
distinguish between the following two hypotheses,
H0 : there is not any trend in vector T; (9)
y(W ) = z(W )
H1 : there is a downward trend in vector T. (10)
y(W ) =
√
P0
dαA,W
· s(A) + z(W )
Given the vector T, Willie can leverage the Cox-Stuart test
[23] to detect the presence of trend. The idea of the Cox-Stuart
test is based on the comparison of the first and the second half
of the samples. If there is a downward trend, the observations
in the second half of the samples should be smaller than in
the first half. If they are greater, the presence of an upward
trend is suspected. If there is not any trend one should expect
only small differences between the first and the second half
of the samples due to randomness.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS AND NOTATION
Symbol Meaning
P0 Transmit power of Alice
t
Number of differences in Cox-Stuart test.
There are 2t sampling points.
α Path loss exponent
m Number of samples in a sampling location
Pi Willie’s received power at i-th sampling location
di Distance between Alice and Willie’s i-th location
d Spacing between sampling points
s(A) Alice’s signal
y(B) , y(W ) Signal (Bob, Willie) observes
z(B), z(W ) (Bob’s, Willie’s) background noise
σ2
B,0, σ
2
W,0 Power of noise (Bob, Willie) observes
yt Willie’s samples at t-th location
T (yt) Signal power at t-th location
T Signal power vector
λ Density of the network
χ2t (m)
Chi-square distribution
with m degrees of freedom (at t-th location)
N (µ, σ2) Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
T∆<0 Test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test
β Significance level of testing
E[X] Mean of random variable X
Var[X] Variance of random variable X
Φ−1(β) β-quantile function of N (0, 1)
The Cox-Stuart test is a sign test applied to the sample of
non-zero differences. To perform a trend analysis on T, the
sample of differences is to be calculated as follows
∆1 = T (y1)− T (yt+1)
∆2 = T (y2)− T (yt+2)
· · · · · ·
∆t = T (yt)− T (y2t)
Let sgn(∆i) = 1 for ∆i < 0, and suppose the sample of
negative differences by ∆1,∆2, ...,∆k, then the test statistic
of the Cox-Stuart test on the vector T is
T∆<0 =
k∑
i=1
sgn(∆i) (11)
Given a significance level β and the binomial distribution
b ∼ b(t, 0.5), we can reject the hypothesis H0 and accept
the alternative hypothesis H1 if T∆<0 < b(β) which means
a downward trend is found with probability larger than 1 −
β, where b(β) is the quantile of the binomial distribution b.
According to the central limit theorem, if t is large enough
(t > 20), an approximation b(β) = 1/2[t+
√
t ·Φ−1(β)] can
be applied, where Φ−1(β) is the β-quantile function of the
standard normal distribution. Therefore, if
T∆<0 <
1
2
[t+
√
t · Φ−1(β)], (12)
Willie can ascertain that Alice is transmitting with probability
larger than 1− β for the significance level β of test.
The parameters and notation used in this paper are illus-
trated in Table I.
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Fig. 2. The signal power at different locations when (a) Alice is silent, or (b)
Alice is transmitting. Here a bounded path loss law is used, l(x) = 1
1+‖x‖α
.
The transmit power P0 of Alice is 30dB, links experience unit mean Rayleigh
fading, and α = 3. The spacing between sampling locations d = 0.5m.
III. ACTIVE WILLIE ATTACK
This section discusses the covert wireless communication
in the presence of active Willie. Bash et al. found a square
root law in AWGN channels [8], which implies that Alice
can transmit O(√n) bits reliably and covertly over n uses of
channels. However, if an active Willie is placed in the vicinity
of Alice, Alice cannot conceal her transmitting behavior.
Willie can detect Alice’s transmission behavior with arbitrarily
low probability of error.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, when Alice is transmitting, Willie
detects Alice’s behavior at 2t different locations. At each
location he gathers m samples and calculates the signal power
at this location. At t-th location (with the distance dt between
Alice and Willie), Willie’s samples are a vector
yt = (y
(W )
t,1 , y
(W )
t,2 , · · · , y(W )t,m ) (13)
with y
(W )
t,i ∼ N (0, σ2W ) and the signal power at this location
is
T (yt) =
1
m
yt
Hyt ∼ Pt + σ
2
0
m
χ2t (m) (14)
where Pt = P0d
−α
t and χ
2
t (m) is the chi-squared distribution
with m degrees of freedom.
Fig. 2 shows examples of the signal power at different
locations when Alice is transmitting or not. We can find that,
even if the channel experiences fading, the downward trend of
the signal power is obvious when Alice is transmitting.
Next we discuss the method that Willie utilizes to
detect transmission attempts. With 2t values T (yi) at
different locations in his hand, Willie decides whether
(T (y1), T (y2), · · · , T (y2t)) has a downward trend or not.
If Alice is transmitting, the probability that the difference
∆i = T (yi)− T (yt+i) < 0 can be estimated as follows,
P{∆i < 0} = P{T (yi) < T (yt+i)}
= P
{
Pi + σ
2
0
m
χ2i (m) <
Pt+i + σ
2
0
m
χ2t+i(m)
}
= P
{
χ2t+i(m)
χ2i (m)
>
Pi + σ
2
0
Pt+i + σ20
}
≤ P
{∣∣∣∣χ2t+i(m)χ2i (m)
∣∣∣∣ > Pi + σ20Pt+i + σ20
}
(15)
where Pi = P0d
−α
i and Pt+i = P0d
−α
t+i.
Given a random variable X and its PDF fX(x), its second
moment can be bounded as
E[X2] =
∫ ∞
−∞
x2fX(x)dx >
∫
|X|≥t
x2fX(x)dx
≥ t2
∫
|X|≥t
fX(x)dx = t
2 · P{|X| ≥ t} (16)
Hence
P{|X| ≥ t} ≤ E[X
2]
t2
(17)
Because χ2i (m) and χ
2
t+i(m) are two independent chi-
squared distributions with m degrees of freedom, then the
random variable Y is
Y =
χ2t+i(m)
χ2i (m)
∼ F (m,m) (18)
where F (m,m) is an F-distribution with two parameters m
and m, and its mean and variance are
E[Y] =
m
m− 2 , Var[Y] =
4(m− 1)m
(m− 2)2(m− 4) (m > 4)
(19)
and when m→∞, E[Y] = 1, Var[Y] = 0.
If Willie can gather enough samples at each location, i.e.,
m is large, according to (17) and (19), we have
P{∆i < 0} ≤ P
{
|Y| > Pi + σ
2
0
Pt+i + σ20
}
≤ Var[Y] +E[Y]
2( Pi+σ20
Pt+i+σ20
)2
=
(
Pt+i + σ
2
0
Pi + σ20
)2
(20)
Therefore the number of negative differences in
∆1,∆2, ...,∆t can be estimated as follows
T∆<0 =
t∑
i=1
1{∆i<0} ≤
t∑
i=1
(
Pt+i + σ
2
0
Pi + σ20
)2
(21)
where 1{∆i<0} is an indicator function, 1{∆i<0} = 1 when
∆i < 0; otherwise 1{∆i<0} = 0.
As to Willie, his received signal strength at i-th location is
Pi = P0d
−α
i = P0(i · d)−α which is a decreasing function of
the distance di. Suppose Willie knows the power level of noise.
At first Willie monitors the environment. When he detects the
anomaly with Pi ≥ σ20 , Willie then approaches Alice to carry
out more stringent testing.
According to the setting, we have
P1 > P2 > · · · > P2t−1 > P2t = σ20 (22)
and
P1 − P2 > Pt+1 − Pt+2,
P2 − P3 > Pt+2 − Pt+3,
· · · · · · · · ·
P1
P2
>
Pt+1
Pt+2
, (23)
P2
P3
>
Pt+2
Pt+3
,
· · · · · · · · ·
Thus
Pt+1 + σ
2
0
P1 + σ20
<
Pt+2 + σ
2
0
P2 + σ20
< · · · < P2t + σ
2
0
Pt + σ20
(24)
Since Pt = 2
αP2t and P2t ≥ σ20 ,
P2t + σ
2
0
Pt + σ20
=
P2t + σ
2
0
2αP2t + σ20
=
1 +
σ20
P2t
2α +
σ2
0
P2t
≤ 2
2α + 1
(25)
According to Equ. (20), the negative differences have
T∆<0 ≤
t∑
i=1
(
Pt+i + σ
2
0
Pi + σ20
)2
≤ t ·
(
2
2α + 1
)2
(26)
If t is large enough, the following inequality holds
T∆<0 ≤ t ·
(
2
2α + 1
)2
<
1
2
[t+
√
t · Φ−1(β)]. (27)
Therefore, given any small significance level β > 0, if the
number of differences t satisfies
t >
(
Φ−1(β)
1− 8(2α+1)2
)2
, (28)
Willie can distinguish between two hypotheses H0 and H1
with probability 1− β.
Fig. 3 shows the significance level β versus t for different
path loss exponent. Less significance level β, more sampling
locations Willie should take to distinguish two hypotheses.
If Alice is transmitting, Willie can ascertain that Alice is
transmitting with probability 1 − β for any small β. This
may be a pessimistic result since it demonstrates that Alice
cannot resist the attack of active Willie and the square root
law [8] does not hold in this situation. If Willie can move
to the vicinity of Alice and have enough sampling locations,
Alice is no longer able to hide her transmission attempts.
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Fig. 3. The significance level β versus t for the path loss exponent α = 3
and α = 4.
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Fig. 4. Constant transmission power versus descending transmission power.
Here constant power is set to 33dB, and the transmission power is descended
from 36dB to 20dB. The spacing between sampling locations d = 0.5m.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES TO ACTIVE WILLIE
The previous discussion shows that, Alice cannot hide her
transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, even
if she can utilize other transmitters (or jammers) to increase
the interference level of Willie, such as the methods used in
[18] [19] [20] [21]. These methods can only raise the noise
level but not change the trend of the sampling value. Next we
discuss two methods that can increase the detection difficulty
of the active Willie.
A. Dynamic power adjustment
If Alice has information about Willie, such as Willie’s
location, the simplest way she can take is decreasing her
transmission power when she finds out that Willie is in her
close proximity. When Willie is very close, Alice simply stops
transmitting and keeps quiet until Willie leaves.
However, Alice may be a small and simple IoT device
who is not able to perceive the environmental information,
let alone knowing Willie’s location. As to the active Willie,
he is a passive eavesdropper who does not interact with any of
the parties involved, attempting to determine the transmission
party. Therefore Willie cannot be easily detected.
In practice, Alice can dynamically adjust her transmission
power to make the decreasing tendency of her signal power
T (Y) unclear to Willie’s detector. As depicted in Fig. 4, Alice
chooses the maximum transmission power pmax = 36dB and
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Fig. 5. The signal power at different locations with the transmission
probability (a) p=0.1, (b) p=0.5, (c) p=0.9, (d) p=0.1 multi-testing, (e) p=0.5
multi-testing, and (f) p=0.9 multi-testing.
the minimum transmission power pmin = 20dB, and at first
transmits at the maximum transmission power, then decreases
∆ = 0.8dB at each location. From the figure we find, if Alice
transmits with decreasing power and Willie approaches Alice
to take further samples, the signal power of Willie’s detector
has a weaker growth trend than the constant transmission
power Alice employed. When Willie is far away from Alice,
the signal power Willie sees has no certain trend, just like
the background noise. Only when Willie approaches Alice, a
growth trend gradually increases and could be detected easily.
This approach can only be used in the occasion that Willie
cannot sneak up on Alice very closely. Besides, if Willie
gradually moves away from Alice and gathers the signal
power in this procedure, he will see a significant downward
trend in his signal power, resulting in the exposure of Alice’s
transmission behavior.
B. Randomized transmission scheduling
In practice, to confuse Willie, Alice’s transmitted signal
should resemble white noise. Alice should not generate burst
traffic, but transforming a bulk message into a slow network
traffic with transmission and silence alternatively. She can
divide the time into slots, then put the message into small
packets. After that, Alice sends a packet in a time slot
with a transmission probability p, or keeps silence with the
probability 1 − p, and so on. Fig. 5 illustrates the examples
of Willie’s sampling signal power T (y1), · · · , T (y2t) in the
case that Alice’s transmission probability p is set to 0.1,
0.5, and 0.9. Clearly, when Alice’s transmission probability
p decreases, the downward tendency of the signal power is
lessening, Willie’s uncertainty increases.
Next we evaluate the effect of the transmission probability
on the covertness of communications. Suppose Alice divides
the time into slots, and transmits at a slot with the transmission
probability p. As to Willie, for each time slot, he samples the
channel m times at a fixed location, then at the next slot he
moves to a closer location to sample the channel, and so on.
The signal power Willie obtained at i-th sampling location can
be represented as follows
T (yi) =
{
σ20
m
χ2i (m) X = 0
Pi+σ
2
0
m
χ2i (m) X = 1
(29)
where X is a random variable, X = 1 if Alice is transmitting,
X = 0 if Alice is silent, and the transmission probability
P{X = 1} = p.
Given the transmitting probability p, the probability that the
difference ∆i = T (yi) − T (yt+i) < 0 can be estimated as
follows
P{∆i < 0} = P{T (yi) < T (yt+i)}
= (1 − p)2 · P
{
χ2i (m)
χ2i+t(m)
< 1
}
+p(1− p) · P
{
χ2i (m)
χ2i+t(m)
<
Pi+t + σ
2
0
σ20
}
+p(1− p) · P
{
χ2i (m)
χ2i+t(m)
<
σ20
Pi + σ20
}
+p2 · P
{
χ2i (m)
χ2i+t(m)
<
Pi+t + σ
2
0
Pi + σ20
}
(30)
where Pi = P0d
−α
i and Pt+i = P0d
−α
t+i.
Since P{F (m,m) < 1} = 12 , thus when p is small enough,
we can approximate Equ. (30) as follows
P{∆i < 0} → (1 − p)2 · P
{
χ2i (m)
χ2i+t(m)
< 1
}
= (1 − p)2 · P{F (m,m) < 1}
=
1
2
(1− p)2 (31)
and the test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test is
T∆<0 =
t∑
i=1
P{∆i < 0} → 1
2
(1− p)2 · t (32)
Therefore, for any small significance value β, Alice can find
a proper transmission probability p which satisfies
T∆<0 =
1
2
(1− p)2 · t > 1
2
[t+
√
t · Φ−1(β)] (33)
This means that, when the transmission probability p is set to
p < 1−
√
1 +
Φ−1(β)√
t
, t > [Φ−1(β)]2 (34)
then Willie cannot detect Alice’s transmission behavior for a
certain significance value β.
Fig. 6 depicts the significance level β versus the trans-
mission probability p for different parameter t in the Cox-
Stuart test. Larger significance level β will result in lower
transmission probability p, and more differences in trend test
t will increase Willie’s detecting ability, which implies that
Alice should decrease her transmission probability.
The randomized transmission scheduling is a practical way
for Alice to decrease the probability of being detected. Al-
though it may increases the transmission latency, Willie’s
uncertainty increases as well.
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Fig. 6. The significance level β versus the transmission probability p for the
number of differences in Cox-Stuart test, t = 50, t = 75, and t = 100.
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Fig. 7. Examples of covert wireless communication in network with static
Willie.
V. COVERT WIRELESS COMMUNICATION IN DENSE
NETWORKS
In practice, to detect the transmission attempt of Alice,
Willie should approach Alice as close as possible, and ensure
that there is no other node located closer to Alice than him.
Otherwise, Willie cannot determine which one is the actual
transmitter.
In a dense wireless network, Bob and Willie not only
experience noise, but also interference from other transmitters
simultaneously. In this scenario, it is difficult for Willie to
detect a certain transmitter tangibly. Fig. 7 illustrates the
dilemma Wille faced in covert wireless communication with
multiple potential transmitters. As shown in Fig. 7(a) and
(b), if Willie (W) finds his observations look suspicious, he
knows for certain that some nodes are transmitting, but he
cannot determine whether Alice (A) or Bob (B) is transmitting.
Even in the case of Fig. 7 (c), Willie cannot determine
with confidence that Alice (A), not Bob (B) is transmitting,
since the received signal strength of Willie is determined by
the randomness of Alice’s signal and the fading of wireless
channels. Therefore it is difficult to be predicted.
For a static and passive Willie, to discriminate the actual
transmitter from the other is an almost impossible task,
provided that there is no obvious radio fingerprinting of
transmitters can be exploited [24]. And what’s worse is, Willie
will be bewildered by a dense wireless network with a large
number of nodes. As depicted in Fig. 8 (a), Willie has detected
suspicious signals, but among nodes A, B, C, and D who
are the real transmitters is not clear. To check whether A is
a transmitter, Willie could move to A along the direction a
and sample at different locations of this path. If he can find
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Fig. 8. Covert wireless communication in a dense network.
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Fig. 9. The detection region of the active Willie (the gray area). Here d0 is
the minimum distance and dmax is the maximum distance that Willie can
take.
a upward trend in his samples via Cox-Stuart test, he could
ascertain that A is transmitting. If a weak downward trend can
be found, Wille can be sure that A is not a transmitter, but C’s
suspicion increases. Willie may move along the direction c to
carry out more accurate testing. If a upward trend is found,
then C may be the transmitter. However, if there is no trend
found, the transmitters may be B or D. Then Willie could move
along direction b or d to find the actual signal source. This
is a slight simplification, and more complicated scenarios are
possible. In the case depicted in Fig. 8 (b), Willie should move
along all four directions, sampling, and testing the existence
of any trend to distinguish Alice among her many neighbors,
potential transmitters.
In a dense wireless network Willie cannot always be able
to find out who is transmitting. As depicted in Fig. 9, the gray
area is the detection region of Willie where there is no other
potential transmitters and dmax is the maximum distance that
can be used by Willie to take his trend statistical test. However
Willie cannot get too close to Alice, d0 is the minimum
distance between them. In a wireless network, some wireless
nodes are probably placed on towers, trees, or buildings, Willie
cannot get close enough as he wishes. If Willie leverages the
Cox-Stuart trend test to detect Alice’s transmission behavior,
the following conditions should be satisfied:
• No other node in the detection region of Willie.
• In the detection region, Willie should have enough space
for testing, i.e., Willie can take as many sampling points
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Fig. 10. The signal power at different sampling locations.
as possible, and the spacing of points is not too small.
As illustrated in Fig. 10, if Willie can only get samples
in the distance interval (d0, dmax) = (2.5, 5)m, it is difficult
to discover a downward trend in the signal power vector he
obtains in a short testing interval.
Suppose dA,W be the distance between Alice and Willie,
then the probability that there is no nodes inside the disk region
with Alice as the centre and dA,W as a radius can be estimated
as follows
P{N = 0} = exp(−πλd2A,W ) (35)
where λ is the density of the network.
Let P{N = 0} > 1− ǫ for small ǫ > 0, we have
dA,W <
√
1
πλ
ln
1
1− ǫ (36)
In a random graph G(n, p), if c = pn > 1, then the largest
component of G(n, p) has Θ(n) vertices, and the second-
largest component has at most 16c(c−1)2 logn vertices a.a.s. If
c = pn = 1, the largest component has Θ(n
2
3 ) vertices [25].
Using the above considerations, we have
c = pn =
λπd2A,W
n
· n = λπd2A,W > 1 (37)
then if the density of the wireless network satisfies the
following condition
λ >
1
πd2A,W
(38)
the wireless network will become a shadow network to Willie
since nodes are so close that he cannot distinguish between
them in a very narrow space.
As illustrated in Fig. 11(a) and (d), as the density increases,
more nodes are close to each other and the connected clusters
(with dmax = 5m) become more larger. In any connected
cluster, Willie is not able to distinguish any transmitter in it
due to the lack of detection space. However if the density
is not enough, there is unconnected nodes and small clusters
in the network . If we want to establish a multi-hop links
to transmit a covert message, the best way is avoiding the
sparse part of the network and let network traffics flow into
the denser part of network. Based on this idea, we next propose
a density-based routing algorithm to enhance the covertness of
multi-hop routing.
Density-Based Routing (DBR): DBR is designed based
on the basic idea: if we can choose the relay nodes with
more neighbors, Willie will confront greater challenges to
distinguish Alice from more potential transmitters. As depicted
in Fig. 12, Alice selects a routing path to the destination
through denser node groups to avoid being found by active
Willie.
DBR is a 2-stage routing protocol which can find routes
from multiple sources to a single destination, a base station
(BS). In the first stage, BS requests data by broadcasting a
beacon. The beacon diffuses through the network hop-by-hop,
and is broadcasted by each node to its neighbors only once.
Each node that receives the beacon setups a backward path
toward the node from which it receives the beacon. In the
second stage, a node i that has information to send to BS
searches its cache for a neighboring node to relay the message.
The local rule is that, among the neighboring nodes who have
broadcasted a beacon to node i, the node who has a larger
number of neighbors will be selected with a higher probability.
Then node i sends the message to the selected relay node j
applied the randomized transmission scheduling. Furthermore,
larger transmission probability will be applied when node i has
more neighbors. Again node j does the same task as node i
until the message reaches BS. Algorithm 1 shows the detailed
description of DBR in node i.
Algorithm 1 Density-Based Routing (Node i)
Input: The set of neighbors of node i: Ni = {i1, i2, ..., ik}
(ik is the locally unique identifier of node), the number of
neighbors of nodes in set Ni: deg(i1), deg(i2), ..., deg(ik),
the average number of neighbors of nodes in the whole
network deg, and the upper bound of default transmission
probability 0 < pmax < 1.
Output: The relay node ck ∈ Ni and the transmission
probability pi of node i.
Initialization: The set of candidate relay nodes Ri = {}.
Stage 1: Beacon Broadcasting:
1) When the node i receives a beacon broadcasting by its
neighbors, it checks to see if this beacon is
rebroadcasted by itself. If not, the node broadcasts the
beacon to its neighbors.
2) Once receiving a beacon broadcasted by its neighbor
ik, node i puts ik into the set of candidate relay nodes
Ri.
Stage 2: Relay Selection:
1) Suppose Ri = {c1, c2, ..., cm} with
deg(c1) ≤ deg(c2) ≤ ... ≤ deg(cm). Node generates a
random number r0 between 0 and 1. If the random
number is
r0 ∈
(
0,
deg(c1)∑m
i=1 deg(ci)
]
(39)
then the node c1 becomes the relay node; Otherwise, if
k > 1 and
r0 ∈
(∑k−1
i=1 deg(ci)∑m
i=1 deg(ci)
,
∑k
i=1 deg(ci)∑m
i=1 deg(ci)
]
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Fig. 11. Examples of dense wireless networks and density-based routing. (a) 300 nodes are distributed evenly in a region of 200 × 100m2. If the distance
between two nodes is less than dmax = 5m, a link between them is established and they are painted in blue. (b) The communication links of subfigure (a)
given the communication radius be 20m. (c) A path of density-based routing from Alice at (200,50) to the base station at (0,50). The relays in red are unsecure
relays. The links in grey are the flooding links established in the stage 1. (d) 300 nodes are distributed unevenly in a region, and the link between nodes is
established if their distance is less than dmax = 5m and they are painted in blue. (e) The communication links of subfigure (d) given the communication
radius be 20m. (f) A path of density-based routing from Alice at (200,50) to the base station at (0,50). The relays in red are unsecure relays. The links in
grey are the flooding links established in the stage 1.
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Fig. 12. Density-Based Routing (DBR).
then the node ck becomes the relay node.
2) Node i chooses his transmission probability as follows
pi =
1
1 + e−xi
· pmax (41)
where xi = deg(i)− deg.
Fig. 11 illustrates examples of density-based routing when
the network is uniform or nonuniform. Fig. 13 depicts the
ratio of secure relays versus the density of network for dif-
ferent routing schemes. Two routing schemes, DBR and GBR
(Gradient-Based Routing [26]), are compared. We can find that
more dense a network is, the relays are more secure, that is,
the transmitters are hidden in a noisy network, not easily be
detected by Willie. Besides, DBR has a better security perfor-
mance than the GBR (Gradient-Based Routing). Furthermore,
a nonuniform network is more secure than a uniform network,
since a nonuniform network has more dense clusters that the
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Fig. 13. The ratio of secure relays versus the density of network for different
routing schemes. The network configuration is illustrated in Fig. 11. GBR is
the gradient-based routing [26].
active Willie cannot distinguish any transmitter (hidden in it)
from more other potential transmitters.
DBR is a simple routing protocol in which each node
does not need sophisticated operations, such as measuring
the distance between it and its neighbors. This is reasonable
since the node in an IoT network may be a very simple node.
However, if the node has the knowledge of the distance to his
neighbors, the security performance may be improved.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that the active Willie is hard to be
defeated to achieve covertness of communications. If Alice
has no prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide her
transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie,
and the square root law is invalid in this situation. We then
propose a countermeasure to deal with the active Willie.
If Alice’s transmission probability is set below a threshold,
Willie cannot detect Alice’s transmission behavior for a certain
significance value. We further study the covert communication
in dense wireless networks, and propose a density-based
routing scheme to deal with multi-hop covert communications.
We find that, as the network becomes more and more dense
and complicated, Willie’s difficulty of detection is greatly
increased. What Willie sees may become a “shadow” network.
As a first step of studying the effects of active Willie on
covert wireless communication, this work considers a simple
scenario with one active Willie only. A natural future work
is to extend the study to multi-Willie. They may work in
coordination to enhance their detection ability, and may launch
other sophisticated attacks. Another relative aspect is how
to extend the results to MIMO channels. Perhaps the most
difficult challenge is how to cope with a powerful active Willie
equipped with more antennas than Alice and Bob have.
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